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Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the court is pursuant to UCA 78A-3-102(3)(j) and (4). The final
order in the case was entered on 3-21-20 l 7(R.369-R.373 ). A notice of appeal was filed
on 3-22-2017 (R.374).

Statement of issues on appeal
1) As a matter of law, are the undisclosed emails subject to attorney client privilege or
common interest privilege?
2) Did the trial court correctly grant summary disposition against Plaintiff?
3) Is it in the public interest to allow privileged communication between lawyers for an
The State Records Committee and the municipalities appearing before it against citizens?
4) Is the vexatious litigant order relied upon by Judge Laura Scott unconstitutional?

Statement of the Case
The case in the district court arose from an appeal of an informal administrative
decision under GRAMA pursuant to UCA 63G-2-404 and a petition for declaratory relief
pursuant to UCA 78B-6-401. (R. 19 amended verified complaint at <JI6, 13-17). The
complaint specifically excluded communications that were only between client and
attorney. (R.19 at <Jl7). An original GRAMA request was made on 9-8-2016 to Paul
Tonks (R. 22 at 9129). The original response was on 9-22-2016 (R.22 at 9130). A timely
appeal was made (R.22 at '1131) and a second denial made by the AG on 9-30-2016(R.22
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at 32). This decision was appealed under GRAMA for de-novo review by the trial court
directly by the timely filing of the case under appeal.
The complaint asks for a judicial determination of the validity of privilege (R. 23
section 1, <J133-39) and an in-camera review of the redactions (R. 23 section 2 <JI40-43),
and a review of the issue of waiver of privilege(R.24 section 3 <Jl44-46). These issues
were preserved upon appeal by from the filing of the complaint and all subsequent
summary disposition filings and are at the center of the issues in this appeal.
Plaintiff first moved for summary disposition on November 11, 2016 (R.53-59)
That motion was unopposed and submitted for decision on November 28, 2016. The
court denied the motion for summary disposition without prejudice on November 28,
2016 as "premature" (R.63). While Plaintiff asserted this ruling was in error, and the
motion timely under the plain language of the rule, I simply refilled it again on November
30, 2016 (R.72-107) and a third time on December 8, 2016 R. 134-168. The third time
was after the filing of a motion to dismiss by the Defendant asking it be converted to a
Rule 56 motion (triggering an absolute right to file a motion for summary disposition
under Rule 56), the prior times were also allowed under separate provisions of Rule 56.
All were timely. All accurately argued the positions in this brief and should have been
granted on the merits.
Rather than file a memorandum in opposition as required to any of those motions,
defendants filed a motion to dismiss Paul Tonks as a Defendant and once again ignored
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the motion for summary disposition. That motion was submitted on January 5, 2017 (R.
182). Rather than address any of the pending motions, the Defendants moved for judicial
notice and a protective order on January 5, 2017. (R.184-209). Plaintiff filed a notice of
discovery issues and motion to compel discovery on January 5, 2017 (R.219-R.222).
Plaintiff had requested a copy of any joint defense agreement through discovery or an
admission that none existed, nothing else.
The trial court almost let the Defendants avoid addressing the substance of this
case, and granted vexatious litigant sanctions against Plaintiff striking most of his
documents. See R.282. However the court did allow the 3rd motion for summary
disposition to go forward, and established a deadline for a response and reply. There was
no finding that the Plaintiff would likely not prevail. Other than the filing of a reply,
Plaintiff was restricted from any further filings without an attorney. Because Plaintiff is
indigent, he was forced to proceed without an attorney in defiance of the orders which he
believes to be unconstitutional and without jurisdiction.
The defendants moved for the first time for summary disposition after the grant of
the protective order. Plaintiff combined his response to this motion for summary
disposition and his reply in support of his motion, and the crossed motions for summary
disposition became the basis for the courts final ruling at R. 369.
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Summary of arguments

The existence of privilege is a legal conclusion which is reviewed giving no
deference to the Trial Court, as is a grant of summary disposition. The two issues are
somewhat intertwined. The burden of proof is on the party asserting privilege to
establish the communication is with a client(broadly defined to include join defense
agreements), and also that the content of the communication is confidential. Once that
proof is established, the privilege can still be waived by disclosure to third parties,
making the topic of the emails a subject of litigation requiring discovery, or by a finding
under GRAMA that the public interest favors waiving that privilege. The trial court
failed to correctly analyze the client prong of privilege, noting that Clearfield and the
State Records Committee (hereinafter SRC) had more than one case with Plaintiff and
Appellant, but nothing more in the way of joint interest. Plaintiff requested an in-camera
review of the emails to determine if the content satisfied the confidential prong of
privilege. This was not done and without that step the Trial Courts conclusion is
speculation and specifically casts the broad generalization "whether the emails discuss
something as simple as timing or more complex jurisdictional or procedural issues," in
admitting ignorance of sufficient facts to establish confidentiality. The client prong of
the analysis requires reversal, and may be determinative of the non-existence of the
privilege. The content prong requires at a minimum remand for an in-camera review.
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In addition the pubic interest clearly weighs in the favor of requiring the SRC to
not participate in a joint defense with a municipality appearing before it, but rather act as
an impartial administrative body. Indeed the answers of the SRC filed by Mr. Tonks all
include the apparently false statement "Neither the granting nor denial of the relief
requested by the Petitioner would have an effect on any legal interest of the Committee."
This issue determines both the public interest prong of the analysis and the existence of a
joint defense prong, requiring both that no privilege exists and that even if it did, the
public interest demands disclosure.
Finally the vexatious litigant order relied upon by the Trial Court was without
jurisdiction and void for violating Article I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution and the
due process provisions of the US constitution, as it is impossible to obey and violates the
plain language of the constitution. In any even Judge Allphin had no jurisdiction to enter
any order controlling anything in this case. As held in Utah v. Hegbloom 2014 UT App
213 atCffl 1 'A void judgment "is open to collateral attack."' Judge Allphin's order is
void.
Issue 1, As a matter of law, are the undisclosed emails subject to attorney client
privilege or common interest privilege?
The standard for review of a decision involving privilege is given by State v.
Johnson, 2008 UT App 5 at Cff9:
"'The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the court, which we
review for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determination."'
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State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Price v.
Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1254 Utah 1997)).
The reviewing court would also be correct to find that the findings made by the
Trial Court are legally insufficient to establish one or more prongs of privilege, and to
remand to the trial court for more detailed factual findings. See Moler v. McCandless,
2008 UT 46 at <Jf 20.
The most basic principle involving privilege is that the court must make 2 factual
determinations at the outset, first if the communication was between a client or their
representative and an attorney or parties in joint interest, and 'The second question that
must be resolved is whether each communication at issue is a "confidential
communication'". See Moler v. CW Management 2008 UT 46 at <Jll2 and 9115.
This issue was preserved in the Trial Court in the complaint and my first, second,
and third motions for summary disposition (R. 141) and the opposition to the motion to
dismiss tonks and opposition to the motion of summary disposition of defendants. I
quote those in full for consideration by the Appeallate court in it's review of the law of
privilege:
In Geometwatch Corporation, vs. Hall, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91274 the
United States District Court For The District Of Utah explained:
As noted above, the common-interest privilege is an extension of the
attorney-client and/or the work-product privileges; it does not stand alone
as an independent privilege. See Static Control Components, Inc., 250
F.R.D. at 578. Thus, the court must first determine that attorney-client
privilege or work-product privilege applies before considering the
common-interest privilege. See Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co.,
136 F.3d 695, 705 (10th Cir. 1998). GMW Investors bear the burden of

Opening brief of the appellant 20170235

Page 10 of 26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

demonstrating that the attorney-client or work-product privileges apply. See
Trans-W. Petroleum, Inc. v. Wolverine Gas & Oil Corp., No. 2:06-CV-801TS-PMW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144744, 2011 WL 6318528, at *3 (D.
Utah Dec. 15, 2011). To demonstrate that the attorney-client privilege
applies to the requested documents, GMW Investors must establish that the
documents contain "confidential communications by a client to an attorney
made in order to obtain legal assistance from the attorney in his capacity as
a legal advisor." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 616 F.3d 1172, 1182 (10th
Cir. 2010). To establish that the documents are work-product, GMW
Investors must prove that they consist of "material assembled by an
attorney in preparation for impending [* 12] litigation." United States v.
Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 783 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
Thus the real first task before the court is to establish if the
communications even have attorney client privilege at all.
Here there was no in-camera review of the emails by the Court despite repeated
request to do so in the complaint (R. 23 section 2 'I{40-43) and in plaintiff's motion for
summary disposition and in Plaintiff's opposition to Defendant's motion for summary
disposition. The "evidence" of the confidentiality of the communications presented by the
Defendants was nothing more than a vague conclusory statement, not made under oath,
by yet another attorney that the AG' s office was representing "clients" when it emailed
Clearfield City. The court even resorted to speculation in it's order finding factually
"And whether the emails discuss something as simple as timing or more complex
jurisdictional or procedural issues, they necessarily include Mr. Tonks mental
impressions, theories, and strategies regarding the case" R. 371-372. This opinion from
the trial court is at odds with the opinions from the US District Court and the Utah
Supreme Court, which have held repeatedly that the specifics matter, factual findings
must have sufficient detail, and the burden belongs to the person asserting privilege. It is

Opening brief of the appellant 20170235

Page 11 of 26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

not at all clear that this factual conclusion is warranted and without in-camera review the
finding is speculatory at best with regard to communications from Tonks. However
looking at R.12, you will see that one of the redacted emails is a communication from
Stuart Williams, who is not with the AG's office, to Mr. Tonks. There is no discussion or
findings of Mr. Williams mental state or the content of that message which is clearly not
covered by privilege. No testimony or other evidence that the emails included Mr. Tonks
theories was presented by the Defendants in support of summary disposition. In fact the
only attachments to the motion for summary disposition were and email from Roger
Bryner and a vexatious litigant order against Mr. Bryner (R. 290-R.332). None of this is
evidence of the confidential nature of the communications in question, and none of it
supports a common interest between the City of Clearfield and the SRC who are the only
"clients" of attorneys.
While it is most certainly not true that timing discussions are automatically
confidential, this does not matter as there is a dispute of fact regarding the content which
precludes summary disposition and the incorrect standard was used to establish
confidentiality. Additionally, the premise that the AG's office representing the Utah
State Record's Committee has municipalities of the state of Utah appearing for it as
"clients" is unprecedented and inconsistent with it's impartiality. There is no support for
a city attorney acting on behalf of the State of Utah and not the municipality he represents
and the email from Mr. Williams must be disclosed.
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Finally, even if both of the predicate requirements, client and confidential, are
found to be factually true, the privilege may be waived by disclosure to a third party or by
making the subject of the communication the focus of litigation. Here because there is no
common interest between Clearfield and the SRC the emails are disclosures to a third
party, even if they would have been privileged if communicated to clients.
The issue of waiver was preserved in the complaint and 3 motions for summary
disposition, the opposition to summary disposition of the defendant, and the opposition to
the motion for summary disposition of the Defendants. The case law and argument are
reproduced from R. 140 for consideration on appeal:
There is one Utah Case that is almost exactly on point for this case, in
which the common interest privilege and disclosure to a 3rd party were discussed.
That is Utah v. Johnson, 2008 UT App 5, which held at <]{20:
<JI20 "The [attorney-client] privilege is recognized in [r]ule 504 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence as well as by statute at [Utah Code section] 78-248(1)." Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, <JI 7, 984 P.2d 980 (footnote omitted),
overruled in part on other grounds by Munson v. Chamberlain, 2007 UT
91, <JICJI 20-21, 590 Utah Adv. Rep. 30. Utah Code section 78-24-8(2)
provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]n attorney cannot, without the consent of
his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him .
. . in the course of his professional employment." Utah Code Ann. § 78-248(2) (2002). The general rule of privilege as provided in rule 504, is as
follows:
A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose
of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client
between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common
interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common
interest, in any combination.
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Utah R. Evid. 504(b ). "The attorney-client privilege 'is intended to
encourage candor between attorney and client and promote the best
possible representation of the client."' Doe, 1999 UT 74, <JI 7 (citation
omitted). Although the legislature and courts have carefully guarded the
integrity of the attorney- client privilege, the supreme court has long held
that it may be waived by a client. See id.
This case establishes that at least in the redacted emails to Clearfield, there
was disclosure to Clearfield, and there was no common interest privilege because
Defendants assert as part of their answer in their complaints as part of public
policy mandate to defendants that it would be improper and unethical for them to
have a common interest at all. Thus any privilege was waived by sharing with
Clearfield. The Utah State Records Committee is created to be a body with a
public interest in enforcing GRAMA, and is legally separate and distinct from
another government body appearing before it and has a legislatively determined
goal which by it's very nature can not be shared with the parties appearing before
it and maintain the neutrality required for an adjudicative body
The most likely topic for these emails is communication from or to third parties
regarding the vexatious litigant order which Clearfield and Tonks made an issue in this
case. If this is the case, and we are to take the findings of the final order at face value,
then Clearfield and the SRC by their conduct in attempting to enforce the
unconstitutional vexatious litigant order have made the content of these emails at issue in
this case and discussed disclosure with third parties and by their conduct waved
confidentiality.

Issue 2, Did the trial court correctly grant summary disposition against Plaintiff?
Summary Judgment in this case essentially upheld a claim of attorney client
privilege and/or work product to any and all emails between the defendants and the
Municipality of Clearfield, Utah involving me. In reviewing Summary Judgment the
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Appellate Court should view the facts and all reasonable inferences from them in the
1

light most favorable to the nonmoving party • See MIND & MOTION v. CELTIC
BANK, 2016 UT 6 at CJ[6 citing Anderson Dev. Co. v. Tobias, 2005 UT 36, CJ[ 31, I 16 P.3d
323. See also JP Morgan Chase Bank v. WRIGHT, 2015 UT App 301 At CJ[7: "We
review a district court's grant of summary judgment for correctness and afford no
deference to the court's legal conclusions.' Salt Lake City Corp. v. Big Ditch Irrigation
Co., 2011 UT 33, <JI 18, 258 P.3d 539."
The court found that I made several GRAMA requests not at issue in this case (<JI I,
R.369), appealed them through the State Record's Committee and then the courts (CJI2)
and that Paul Tonks was the attorney for the SRC(9[3). The court found that the SRC's
answers in GRAMA cases established that "neither granting or denial of the relief
requested by the petitioner would have any effect on the legal interest of the [SRC](<Jl4
R.370). The court found that there was no formal joint defense agreement between
Clearfield and the SRC(<J15), and that emails were exchanged between counsel for
Clearfield and Tonks(CJ[6). The court found that I made requests for those emails and
properly appealed the denial of that request to the district court (CJ[7-9). That is it. No
evidence of the content of the emails being work product of any attorney, joint work
product, or any other findings were considered. No in-camera review of the emails was
conducted, even though it was requested. There is no genuine dispute of facts in this case

1

Both Defendants and Plaintiff moved for summary disposition. Defendant's motion was granted hy the Trial
Court, thus they are the moving party.
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outside the speculative content of the emails themselves, which may or may not be
genuinely confidential and may or may not involve communications with third parties.
Because the undisputed facts do not support a specific joint interest, and in fact establish
the lack of a join interest, there can be no client relationship. Separately, because the
confidentiality of the emails is a disputed fact, summary disposition on this point is not
appropriate and the court should have held an in-camera review and heard evidence and
testimony regarding the actual issue of confidentiality. Finally the issues of waiver by
disclosure to third parties and making the communications at issue in a case were not
addressed, and without a trial and presentation of evidence they can not be. For these
reasons a grant of summary disposition for the Defendants was improper, and must be
reversed. If the Court of Appeals agrees that there can be no client or joint relationship
between Clearfield City and the AG's office, then summary disposition in favor of the
Plaintiff was appropriate, and the Court of Appeals should order that the Trial Court grant
summary disposition to the Plaintiff and order disclosure of the emails.

Issue 3, Is it in the public interest to allow privileged communication between lawyers
for an The State Records Committee and the municipalities appearing before it against
citizens?
Plaintiff and Appellant submitted to the court that the SRC functions as an
administrative law body for GRAMA, and the City of Clearfield was one of two
allegedly equal parties appearing before it, thus public interest favors not allowing secret
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collusion between an adjudicative body and a party appearing before it. As a legal
argument, I posited that merely being co-defendants is not legally sufficient to establish a
joint defense privilege, and that there should be some burden of proof on the defendants
to establish that a joint common interest, beyond merely being codefendants, was
required.
SCHROEDER v. UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE and the UTAH
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE, 2015 UT 77 at <JI3 holding "Under GRAMA, the state
has no obligation to disclose attorney work product, but a district court may nevertheless
order disclosure if the interests favoring disclosure outweigh those favoring protection."
In Schroeder at <Jll 9 the Supreme Court held "And here, the court's balancing
analysis improperly focused on general policy concerns without discussing how those
interests specifically applied to the records at issue in this case." Here there was no
balancing analysis. The trial court ignored the unique position of the SRC as a
(supposedly) impartial administrative entity that is tasked with fairly deciding cases
brought before it. The secret communications between the SRC and one, but not both of
the parties that appeared before it calls into question the impartiality of the body. That is
a significant public interest, on it's face. The Supreme Court should hold that even if
there existed a common legal interest between Clearfield and the SRC, the position of
Clearfield as party that appeared before the SRC is an impermissible conflict and no joint
defense privilege should be allowed.
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Unlike some analysis under the Joint defense privilege, the public interest is
actually relevant in establishing if a permissible joint defense interest existed. It would
be a violation of the public trust for the SRC to become an advocate for one side
appearing before it, and an opponent of another, and the allow it to accomplish this in
secret. The public has an interest in knowing that the SRC functions as an independent
entity and not in collusion with some of the parties appearing before it. This is made
more questionable by the undisputed finding of fact made by the court in paragraph 4. If
the SRC is publicly in it's answer expressing neutrality, but in fact acting on a secret
common interest in favor of it's fellow government lawyers, this is a mater for public
interest demanding disclosure. This begs the question, what was the common interest
that is permissible to mislead the public about and keep secret? The exact language
included in every answer filed by Paul Tonks for the SRC reads "Neither the granting

nor denial of the relief requested by the Petitioner would have an effect on any legal
interest of the Committee.(Emphasis added)" See R.21-22 amended complaint and
Exhibit H and G at R.28 and R.31.

If the Court of Appeals agrees that the public interest in not allowing secret
communications between the SRC and municipal bodies appearing before it outweighs
any claim of attorney client confidentiality by the SRC then the disclosure of the emails
should be ordered. Likewise if the Court of Appeals agrees that the statement above
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disclaims any common interest, and the attorney for the SRC should be held to that
disclaimer he signed, then disclosure of the emails should be ordered.

Issue 4, ls the vexatious litigant order relied upon by Judge La,ura Scott
unconstitutional?
The Court of appeals has the jurisdiction to review the order of the Trial Court.
The Trial Court ruled it lacked jurisdiction to address Judge Allphin's order. This is
incorrect, as it is Judge Allphin who lacked the jurisdiction to enter an order which
violates the constitution, and also lacked the jurisdiction to enter an order impacting a
case filed in another district which had a currently assigned Judge. Jurisdiction may be
raised at any time and does not need to be preserved in lower courts.
I violated the plain language of the order by filing a notice of appeal and all
documents I filed in the case at issue. I have not obtained counsel, although the order
clearly requires that I do so (See R. 328 paragraph i). Being indigent, it is beyond reason
to believe I could afford appellate counsel in this matter. There is no right to state funded
counsel for this in Utah and even where that right exists, the State ignores it and does not
provide counsel to indigent defendants in Justice Courts. Thus I am left with the choice
to either intentionally defy the order and proceed without counsel or obey the order and
waive my rights. I am guided by the Utah Constitution Article 1 section 11 reading "and
no person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State,
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party" in making my choice.
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Because the constitution of the State of Utah establishes that I may not be barred from
representing myself in any action in the State of Utah, and the constitution necessarily
overrules any order of the court, I have chosen and will continue to chose to intentionally
disobey the unconstitutional order of Judge Allphin, which I would be incapable of
obeying even if I were so inclined.
While it is possible for Rule 83 to be constitutional when it orders a private citizen
to obtain counsel and not represent a corporation, it is not possible to order a private
citizen to not represent themselves under the Utah and US constitution even if they could
afford it. Because those who are indigent can not afford counsel, such an order acts as an
unconstitutional complete bar to access to the courts.
Every document in this case, from the appeal to the motion to waive fees, has been
filed in willful and knowing violation of this explicit provision of Judge Allphin' s order.

If the court of appeals actually intends to equally apply the law and fearlessly apply it, the
choice is clear. It must either strike the notice of appeal as not complying with the
vexatious litigant order, or do the right thing and at least acknowledge that it is void and
without force as violating the constitution of the State of Utah and the due process
provisions of the US constitution. Key to due process it the ability to respond in court. If
I am prevented from proceeding without doing the impossible, then the order is
unconstitutional.
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This issue was preserved in the reply and response on crossed summary
disposition. To quote from R.347 for consideration by the court of Appeals:
Collateral attack is possible on orders entered without jurisdiction. See
Utah v. Hegbloom 2014 UT App 213 at <Jll l:
<Jll l A void judgment "is open to collateral attack." Farley v. Farley,
431 P.2d 133, 137 (Utah 1967); 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments§ 29 (2006). But
"[t]he concept of a void judgment is narrowly construed in the interest of
finality." Brimhall v. Mecham, 494 P.2d 525, 526 (Utah 1972). Two
circumstances may render a judgment void. First, a "judgment [is] void on
its face for lack of jurisdiction in the court." Bowen v. Olsen, 246 P.2d 602,
605 (Utah 1952). Second, a judgment is void when the court entering the
judgment "acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law."
Brimhall, 494 P.2d at 526 .....
Here the argument is simple. This case was initiated on October 20,
2016 in the 3rd district court. No objection was made, or can be made to the
validity of this action. The vexatious litigant order was entered on December 15,
2016 in the 2nd district in a case with different defendants, and was not made by
the Judge Assigned to this case. There has never been a finding in this case
required under Rule 83(c)(l)(B) that "there is no reasonable probability that the
vexatious litigant will prevail on the claim." The court has repeatedly had fully
briefed motions for summary disposition before it but refused to address the
substantial issues of law and fact before it, rather focusing on ad-homnium attacks
on Roger Bryner and procedural delay. The order that I must obtain counsel
before proceeding, either from Judge Allphin or Judge Scott, does not comply with
Rule 83(c)(l)(B) and is void from it's issuance because I can't afford an attorney
and the State of Utah will not provide one for me and will not be obeyed by me.
This issue can not become moot under any outcome. If the court of appeals grants
relief in whole or part, I will be unable to proceed in trial court without further willful
violations of the order as I remain unable to afford counsel and even if I could, I chose to
disobey the unconstitutional order. If the Court of Appeals does not grant relief, I fully
intend to disobey the order and proceed without counsel (both out of necessity and
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choice) to proper reviewing courts. I am unable to guess which parts of the order are
void and without jurisdiction, and identifying at least one renders the whole order is void
on it's face.

Conclusion
I ask that the court of Appeals reverse the decisions dismissing Paul Tonks and
granting summary disposition against the plaintiff, and to grant whatever relief is just and
proper including but not limited to any of the following:
1) Rule that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the confidential
nature of the communications, and order an in-camera review.
2) Rule that there is insufficient findings regarding the attorney client and joint
interest relationship between Paul Tonks, as an attorney and any potential clients or joint
parties in interest or in the alternative rule there is no privilege.
3) Rule that there is no plausible attorney or client relationship between Stuart
Williams, counsel for Clearfield City, and Paul Tonks, counsel for the SRC and order the
communication from Stuart Williams to Paul Tonks disclosed.
4) Rule that there is a public interest in the Utah State Record's committee
remaining impartial and not having a confidential joint interest with any party appearing
before it, including but not limited to Clearfield City.
5) Rule that the public interest in impartiality of the Utah State Record's
committee necessitates disclosure of all of the emails.
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6) Rule that the order of Judge Allphin can not be applied to this case as Allphin' s
order violates Article 1 section 11 of the Utah Constitution and Judge Allphin lacks
jurisdiction to enter any order in the trial court in this case.

Dated January 18, 2018
Roger Bryner

Opening brief of the appellant 20170235

Page 23 of 26

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Certificate of mailing
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on January 18, 2018 I did cause this to be delivered by email to:
LONNY J. PEHRSON (#09773)
£) · ~
Counsel for Defendants
/ ~~
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 140860
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0860
lpehrson@utah.gov

Addendum
Article I, Section 11. [Courts open -- Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil
cause to which he is a party.

Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...
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U.R.C.P 56
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or crossclaim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment at any time
after service of a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party or after 21 days
from the commencement of the action. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may move for summary
judgment at any time. Unless the court orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for
summary judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the close of all discovery.
U.R.C.P. 83
(c )( 1) Before entering an order under subparagraph (b }, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(c)(l)(A) the party subject to the order is a vexatious litigant; and
(c )( 1)(B) there is no reasonable probability that the vexatious litigant will prevail on the
claim.
Exhibit A

03-21-17 Filed order: Ruling and Order on ( 1) Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Disposition; and (2) Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (R.369-R.373)

Exhibit B

01-27-17 Ruling Entry- ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS
Judge: SCOTT, LAURA (R.283-284)
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Exhibit C

Statement by Paul Tonks that there is no interest of his client SRC in
common with Clearfield contained in answers to complaints, R. 28-29 and
R. 31-32

Exhibit D

Redacted emails R. 12-16.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

MAR 2 1 2017
By:

a.-~

Salt Lake County
ro-:-uty Clerk

ROGER BRYNER

RULING AND ORDER ON (1)
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION; AND (2) DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARYJUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 160906562

PAUL TONKS; UTAH ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S OFFICE

Judge Laura S. Scott
Defendants.
March 21, 2017

Introduction
Before the Court are (1) Plaintiff Roger Bryner's Motion for Summary Disposition
(Plaintiff's Motion) and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Defendants' Motion).
Neither party requested oral argument on the Motions. Having considered the arguments and
briefing, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's Motion and GRANTS Defendants' Motion.
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts
Plaintiff made several records requests to Clearfield City pursuant to the
Government Records Access and Management Act (ORAMA).
1.

2.
Dissatisfied with the responses of Clearfield City and the decisions of the State
Records Committee (SRC), Plaintiff filed actions against them in the Second Judicial District
Court for Davis County, including the cases entitled Bryner v. Clearfield City, Case No.
150701062 and Bryner v. Clearfield City, Case No. 160700423 .1
3.
Defendant Utah Attorney General's Office (AGO) is counsel to the SRC.
Defendant Assistant Attorney General Paul Tonks (Tonks) represented the SRC in these cases.
4.
The SRC's answers in the above-referenced cases asserted as part of the
affinnative defenses that the SRC is not an "active party" and that "[n]either the granting nor
denial of the relief requested by the Petitioner would have an effect on any legal interest of the
[SRC]."

1

These are the two cases specifically referenced in Plaintiff's Motion.
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5.
The SRC and Clearfield City did not execute a written joint defense agreement in
connection with these cases.
6.
Emails were exchanged between Mr. Tonks, attorney for the SRC, and Stuart
Williams, attorney for Clearfield City, regarding the cases. Redacted copies of these emails were
provided to Plaintiff in response to the ORAMA request that is at issue in Case No. 150701062.
7.
On September 9, 2016, Plaintiff made a ORAMA request to the AGO. Plaintiff
requested un-redacted copies of these emails. These emails are owned and maintained by the
AGO.
8.
On September 22, 2016, the AOR responded in writing to Plaintiffs ORAMA
request. The AGO denied the request on the ground that the emails are classified as "protected
records" because they are attorney-client privilege and/or records prepared for or by an attorney
of a governmental entity for, or in anticipation of, litigation.
9.
Plaintiff appealed the AGO's denial of his ORAMA request. On September 30,
2016, Plaintiff's appeal was denied. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this action against the AGO and
Mr. Tonks.

Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment may be entered when "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter law. " 2 All "facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom [should be viewed] in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party."3
Under ORAMA, the AGO bears the burden of showing that it properly classified the
emails as protected. See Deseret News Pub. Co. v. Salt Lake County, 2008 UT 26. If the emails
are properly classified as protected, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the public interest favoring access is equal to or greater than
the interest favoring restriction of access. 4
Attorney-Client Privilege
Defendants assert that the emails are properly classified as protected wider Utah Code§
630-2-305(17), which provides that "records that are subject to the attorney client privilege" are
protected.
2

Swan Creek VIII. Homeowners Ass 'n v. Warne, 2006 UT 22, 1 16, 134 P.3d 1122 (quoting Norman v. Arnold, 2002
UT 81, 1 15, 57 P.3d 997), Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (''The judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.")
3

Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C., 2008 UT 28, 1Jl2, 183 P.3d 248 (quoting Dowling v. Bullen, 2004
UT SO, ,I7, 94 P.3d 915).

4

Utah Code Ann.§ 630-2-406(1).
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Relevant to this case, the attorney client privilege is found in rule 504(b)(2)(B) of the
Utah Rules of Evidences, which states that a client - in this case the SRC - "has a privilege to
refuse to disclose and prevent any other person from disclosing, confidential communications ...
"made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional services to the client" and the
communications were "among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyers representatives, and
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest." The privilege may be claimed by the
lawyer (the AGO) on behalf of the client (the SRC).
Here, it is widisputed that the emails were between the SRC's lawyer- Mr. Tonks of the
AGO - and Clearfield City's lawyer- Mr. Williams. 5•6 Thus, the question is whether the emails
were "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services" to the SRC in
connection with "matters of common interest." The Court agrees with Defendants that the
records were properly classified as protected because they are subject to the attorney client
privilege.
As a preliminary matter and as Defendants correctly point out, rule 504 does not require a

joint defense agreement. Therefore, the lack of a joint defense agreement - written or otherwise
- is not "material" or relevant to the Motions.
The Court determines that the emails were for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services to the SRC. The SRC and Clearfield City are co-defendants in several
lawsuits filed by Plaintiff. The subject lines of the emails reference the lawsuits, i.e., Notice to
Submit (June 15, 2016), Bryner Case No. 150801062 (June 30, 2016), and Bryner's Side Case
(August 11, 2016). Further, the Court determines that defending multiple lawsuits brought by
Plaintiff is a matter of "common interest" between the SRC and Clearfield City. This finding
does not undermine the SRC's neutrality in the appeals process. Nor does the SRC's assertion in
two cases that it was not an "active" party and that the outcome of the cases would not affect its
legal interests preclude it from sharing a common interest with Clearfield City in the
management of the lawsuits and the resolution of jurisdictional and procedural issues raised in
the lawsuit.
Attorney Work Product
Defendants also assert that the emails are properly classified as protected under Utah
Code § 630-2-305(18), which provides that "records prepared ... by an attorney ... of a
governmental agency for, or in anticipation of, litigation ..." are protected. 7
The Court also agrees with Defendants that the emails are properly classified as attorney
work product because they were prepared and sent regarding the ongoing litigation between
Plaintiff and the SRC and Clearfield City. And whether the emails discuss something as simple
as timing or more complex jurisdictional or procedural issues, they necessarily include Mr.
5

Mr. Tonks' assistant - Nicole Alder - is "cc'ed" on the August 11, 2016 email. She would be considered a
"lawyer's representative" under rule 504(b)(2)(B).
6

Utah Code § 630-2-502(7) provides that the AGO "shall provide counsel" to the SRC.

7

Utah Code § 630-2-305( 18).
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Tonks' mental impressions, theories, and strategies regarding the cases. Accordingly, the emails
are properly classified as protected pursuant to the attorney work product privilege.
Public Interest
The Court may order the disclosure of records that are properly classified as "protected"
only when the "party seeking disclosure of the record has established, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the public interest favoring access is equal to or greater than the interest favoring
restriction of access. "8 Plaintiff has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the
public interest favoring access is equal to or greater than the interest favoring restriction. His
unsupported argument that a protected classification violates the SRC's neutrality is not
sufficient because ORAMA specifically requires the AGO to act as counsel for the SRC. And as
its counsel, the AGO is required to provide legal advice to the SRC regarding procedw-al and
jurisdictional issues, controlling legal precedent, and statutory interpretation. The public has a
compelling interest in ensuring that the SRC receives effective legal representation and the
ability of the AGO to do so would be severely undennined if its communications with its client
and with counsel for co-defendants were not protected by the attorney client privilege and/or the
attorney work product privilege. Moreover, Plaintiff has not identified a public interest favoring
access that is equal to or greater than the public's interest in preserving these privileges even
when the "client" is a governmental entity.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Disposition and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 9
SO ORDERED this* day of March, 2017.
BY THE COURT:

LAURA S. SCOTT
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
1

Utah Code § 630-2-406( 1).

9

After this case was filed, Judge Michael G. Allphin of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County entered a
Ruling and Order on Order to Show Cause (Vexatious Litigant Order) on December I 5, 2016. Judge Allphin found
Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant under rule 83(a)(l)(C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In a previous Ruling
and Order entered January 27, 2017, the Court took judicial notice of the Vexatious Litigant Order but declined
Defendants' request to apply it retroactively in this case so that they did not have to respond to Plaintiff's Motion.
The Court also pennitted Plaintiff to file an opposition to Defendants' Motion and a reply to Plaintiffs Motion
notwithstanding the Vexatious Litigant Order. In his "Memorandum in Reply and Response to Memorandum of
Defendant," Plaintiff asks the court to rule on the validity of the Vexatious Litigant Order. The Court declines to do
so. If Plaintiff wants to challenge the validity of the Vexatious Litigant Order, then he must do so through the proper
appellate procedures.
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following
people for case 160906562 by the method and on the date specified.
MANUAL EMAIL:
MANUAL EMAIL:

ROGER BRYNER roger.bryner@yahoo.com
LONNY J PEHRSON lpehrson@utah.gov

03/21/2017

/s/ EMILY AGUILAR-CUESTA

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 03/21/17 17:31:03
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
At the dµ:_ectlon·qf{
Dated: January 27, 2017
05: 10:03 PM
Isl LAURf' SCcOJrr--,~' \
District Co~@qge [

by Isl

EMIL ;-'XG-~!~;k:{uESTA
District Court Clerk

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,

RULING

Plaintiff,

ORDER RE PENDING MOTIONS

vs.

Case No: 160906562

PAUL TONKS,

Judge: SCOTT, LAURA
Defendant.

Before this

Date:

Court are four matters:

January 27, 2017

(1) Plaintiff's Third Motion for Summary

Disposition, which was filed on December 8, 2016 and submitted for decision on January
5, 2017;

(2) Plaintiff's Rule 37 Statement of Discovery Issues and Proposed Order,

submitted for decision on January 19, 2017;

(3) Defendants• Motion for Judicial Notice

and Protective Order; and (4) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
This Court will first address the Motion for Judicial Notice and Protective Order.
After Plaintiff's Third Motion for Summary Disposition was filed on December 8, 2016,
Judge Michael G. Allphin in the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County entered
a Ruling and Order on Order to Show Cause (Vexatious Litigant Order) on December 15,
2016.
Relevant to this case, Judge Allphin found Plaintiff to be a vexatious litigant under
Rule 83(a) (1) (C) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Accordingly, the Vexatious

Litigant Order requires Plaintiff, for all future litigation actions, to obtain legal
counsel before proceeding in a pending action and obtain leave from the assigned judge
in any pending case to file any paper, pleading or motion.
Defendants ask this Court to take judicial notice of the Vexatious Litigant Order and
retroactively apply it to the Third Motion for Summary Disposition so that they do not
have to respond to it.

This Court grants the Motion in part and denies it in part.

The Court hereby takes judicial notice of the Vexatious Litigant Order.

However, the

Court declines to apply it retroactively.
Therefore, Defendants are ordered to respond to Plaintiff's Third Motion for Summary
Disposition by February 6, 2017.

If they fail to do so, the Court will consider the

Third Motion without the benefit of Defendants• response.

Plaintiff may file a reply
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Case No: 160906562 Date:

Jan 27, 2017

to the Third Motion provided that it fully complies with Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, including the page limits. Along with the reply, Plaintiff may file a
notice to submit for decision. PLAINTIFF MAY NOT FILE ANY OTHER PLEADINGS WITH THE
COURT UNLESS HE COMPLIES WITH THE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT ORDER.
Because the Rule 37 Statement of Discovery was filed after the Vexatious Litigant
Order, the Court hereby strikes it because Plaintiff did not comply with the
requirements set forth in the Order. Defendants are not required to respond to it.
After receiving Defendants• response to the Third Motion for Summary Disposition, if
filed by February 6, 2017, the Court will rule on the Third Motion and Defendants•
Motion to Dismiss.
AGAIN, OTHER THAN FILING A REPLY AND NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR THE THIRD MOTION, PLAINTIFF
IS ORDERED TO FULLY COMPLY WITH THE VEXATIOUS LITIGANT ORDER IN THIS CASE. IF HE FAILS
TO DO SO, THE COURT MAY FIND PLAINTIFF IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND IMPOSE AN APPROPRIATE
SANCTION.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION

I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 160906562 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

ROGER BRYNER roger.bryner@yahoo.com
LONNY J PEHRSON lpehrson@utah.gov
01/27/2017

/s/ EMILY AGUILAR-CUESTA

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk
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through 36, 39, 41 through 47, 53, 58, 60, 62 through 79, 81 through 86, 89, 92, 95, 98
through I 00, and 102 through 108 of the Complaint, and therefore, denies the same.

FIRST DEFENSE: RESPONDENT UTAH STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE IS
NOT AN ACTIVE PARTY TO THIS ACTION
Utah Code § 63G-2-404( 1)( c) makes the Utah State Records Committee
("Committee") a necessary party to a petition for review by the district court of the
Committee's order. However, this matter is a judicial review by the district court of a
governmental entity's determination to not release a record and is governed by Utah Code
§ 63G-2-404, which does not require the Committee to be an active party. Neither the
granting nor denial of the relief requested by the Petitioner would have an effect on any
legal interest of the Committee. However, in order to preserve legal standing for any
issues which may impact the Committee, the Utah State Records Committee wishes to
remain a party and receive all correspondence and court orders associated with the present
case.

Answer to Proposed Second Amended Complaint
Civil No. 150701062
Page 3
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DATED this 24 th day of December 2015.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

Isl Paul H. Tonks
PAUL H. TONKS
Assistant Attorney General
5110 State Office Building
P.O. Box 141160
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1160
Telephone: (801) 538-9501

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 24 th day of December 2015, I emailed and transmitted a true and
correct copy of the foregoing ANSWER TO PROPOSED SECOND AMENDED AND
SUPPLEMENTAL GRAMA COMPLAINT to be electronically filed with the clerk of the
above court, using the Utah Trial Court/ECF System, which sent notification of such filing to the
following:
ROGER BRYNER
General Delivery
Kaysville, Utah 8403 7
Petitioner
roger.bryner@yahoo.com

STUART E. WILLIAMS
Clearfield City Attorney
55 South State Street
Clearfield, Utah 84015
Counsel for Respondent, City of Clearfield

Isl Paul H. Tonks
PAUL H. TONKS

Answer to Proposed Second Amended Complaint
Civil No. 15070 l 062
Page4
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Summons on April 29, 2016.
The Committee hereby answers the Amended ORAMA Complaint as follows:
ANSWER

1. Respondent, Utah State Records Committee, admits paragraphs 1 through 2, 5 through 10,
14, 16 through 22, 24 through 27, and 29 of the Complaint.
2. Respondent, Utah State Records Committee, admits paragraph 3 with the correction that
the Committee is a necessary party pursuant to Utah Code § 630-2-404( 1)(b ).
3. Respondent, Utah State Records Committee, denies paragraphs 23, 28, 31, and 34 of the
Complaint.
4. Respondent, Utah State Records Committee, is without sufficient knowledge of the
allegations in paragraphs 4, 11 through 13, 15, 30, 32 through 33, and 35 through 37 of the
Complaint, and therefore, denies the same.
FIRST DEFENSE: RESPONDENT UT AH ST ATE RECORDS COMMITTEE IS NOT AN
ACTIVE PARTY TO THIS ACTION

Utah Code§ 63G-2-404{l)(c) makes the Utah State Records Committee ("Committee") a
necessary party to a petition for review by the district court of the Committee's order. However,
this matter is a judicial review by the district court of a governmental entity's determination to not
release a record and is governed by Utah Code § 630-2-404, which does not require the
Committee to be an active party. Neither the granting nor denial of the relief requested by the
Petitioner would have an effect on any legal interest of the Committee. However, in order to
Answer to Proposed Second Amended Complaint
Civil No. 15070 l 062
Page 2
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preserve legal standing for any issues which may impact the Committee, the Utah State Records
Committee wishes to remain a party and receive all correspondence and court orders associated
with the present case.

SECOND DEFENSE: ISSUES REGARDING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UTAH CODE
§ 63G-2-702(2) CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT WITHOUT PROPER
SERVICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
Service of a complaint upon a State Governmental Entity represented by the Utah Attorney
General's Office does not automatically satisfy service upon the Utah Attorney General sufficient
to challenge the constitutionality of a statutory provision within the Utah Code. If a party
challenges the constitutionality of a statute in an action in which the Attorney General has not
appeared, the party raising the question of constitutionality shall notify the Attorney General of
such fact. Utah R. Civ. P. 24(d)(l). Failure of a party to provide notice as required by the Civil
Rules is not a waiver of any constitutional challenge otherwise timely asserted. Utah R. Civ. P.
24(d)(3).
DATED this 19th day of May 2016.
SEAN D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

Isl Paul H. Tonks
PAUL H. TONKS
Assistant Attorney General
5110 State Office Building
P.O. Box 141160
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1160
Telephone: (801) 538-9501
Answer to Proposed Second Amended Complaint
Civil No. 150701062
Page 3
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Nancy Dean
Paul Tonks <ptonks@utah.gov>
Wednesday, June 15, 2016 3:03 PM
Stuart Williams
Nicole Alder
Re: Notice to Submit

From:
Sent:
To:

Cc:
Subject:

Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 15, 2016, at 2:43 PM, Paul Tonks <ptonks@utnh.gov> wrote:

---Stuart
Sent from my iPhone

On Jun 15, 2016, at 1:38 PM, Paul Tonks <ptonks@utah.gov> wrote:

- Paul
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Paul H. Tonks, Assistant Attorney General
State Agency Counsel Division
Utah Attorney General's Ollicc
5110 State Office Bui Iding
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-2477
(801) 538..9501
ptonks@utah.gov

The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential
information intended only for the use or the individual or entity named above
and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient
or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you
are hereby notified that any dissemination. distribution, or copying of this
communication is strictly prohibited. Ir you have received this cmnmunication
in error, please immediately notiJy us by telephone (801) 366-0353 or by reply
to this message. Also. please delete the original mt!ssagc. Thank you.
<Bryner Notice to Submit.pdf.>
CONFIDENTIAL: The information contained in this email, and any attachments, is
confidential and/or private or may be covered by the Electronic Communications Act, 18
U.C.S. 2510-2521. If you are not the intended recipient or agent thereof, you are hereby
notified you have received this document in error and you are legally prohibited from
retaining, using, copying, distributing or otherwise disclose this infonnation. Please reply to
the sender that you have received this communication in error and immediately delete the
document. Thank you.

Paul H. Tonks. Assistant Attorney General
State Agency Counsel Division
Utah Attorney General's Office
5110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-24 77
(80 I) 538-9501
ptonks@utah.gov
The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential infonnation intended
only tbr the use of the individual or entity named above and may be privileged. If the reader of
this message is not the intended recipient or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to
the intended recipient. you arc hereby notified that any dissemination. distribution. or copying
of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received this communication in error.
please immediately notify us by telephone (801) 366-0353 or by reply to this message. Also.
please delete the original message. Thank you.

CONFIDENTIAL: The information contained in this email, and any attachments, is confidential and/or private
or may be covered by the Electronic Communications Act, 18 U.C.S. 2510-2521. If you are not the intended
recipient or agent thereof, you are hereby notified you have received this docwnent in error and you are legally
prohibited from retaining, using, copying, distributing or otherwise disclose this infonnation. Please reply to
2
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the sender that you have received this communication in error and immediately delete the document. Thank
you.

Paul 11. Tonks, Assistant Attorney General

State Agency Counsel Division
Utah Attorney General's Office
51 JO State Office Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-2477
(801) 538-950 J
ptonks@,utah.gov
The information contained in this electronic mail message is confidential information intended only for the use
of the individual or entity named above and may be privileged. If the reader of this message is not the intended
recipient or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient. you are hereby notified that
any dissemination, distribution\ or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If you have received
this communication in error, please immediately notify us by telephone (801) 366-0353 or by reply to this
message. Also. please delete the original message. Thank you.
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Nancy Dean
From:

Sent:
To:

Subject:

Paul Tonks <ptonks@utah.gov>
Thursday, June 30, 2016 9:54 AM
Stuart Williams
Bryner Case No. 150701062

- Paul

Paul 11. Tonks, Assistant /\llorney General
State Agency Counsel Division
Utah Attorney General's Of1ice
5 11 0 State Office Building
Sall Lake City, Utah 84 11 4-2477
(80 I) 538-950 I

ptonks(w,utah.gov
The inl'ormation <.:ontnined in this electronic mai l message is confidential in formation intended onl y for the use
ol'thc individual or entity named above and may be privileged. 1r1hc reader of this message is not the intended
recipient or the employee or agent responsible to del iver it to the intended recipient. you arc hereby notifo:d that
any dissemination. distribution, or copying or this communication is strictly prohibited. Ir you have received
this communication in error. please immediately noti fy us hy telephone (80 I) 366-0353 or by repl y to this
message. Also, please delete the ori ginal message. Thank you.
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Nancy Dean
From:

Sent:

To:
Cc:
Subject:
Attachments:

Paul Tonks <ptonks@utah.gov>
Thursday, August 11, 2016 1:02 PM
Stuart Williams
Nicole Alder
Bryner's Side Case
Bryner Complaint.pdf; Bryner Amended Complaint2.pdf

-Paul

Paul H. Tonks. Ass istant Attorney General
State Agency Counsel Divisicm
Utah Attorney General's Office
5110 State Office Building
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-24 77
(80 1) 538-9501

ptonksw)utah.gov
The in formation contained in this electronic mail message is confidential in fo rmation intended only for the use

orthe individual or entity named above and may be pri vileged. Ir the reader of this message is not the intended
recipient or the employee or agent responsible to deliver it to the intcmkd recipient. you arc hereby noti licd that
any dissemination. distribution, or copying ofth i~ communicmion is strictly proh ibited. If you have received
thi s t;Omrnunication in cnor, plt.:asc immediately notily us by telephone (80 I ) 366-03 53 or by reply to this
message. Also, please delete the original message. Thank you.
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